Introduction
In the wake of the Russian transition to a market economy, the interaction of new post-Soviet business and regional/local government has become one of the most important issues on the political agenda. "Business-power" relations has also become one of the most important and popular themes in scholarly study. But there remains a need for a more scientific background to the study of this question.
One approach to this question has been the elitist approach, which tackles the theme in terms of elite transformation. Business elites are seen as an active part of society and of the national elite. Their economic interests encourage them to take part in power struggles and they often seek to become politicians. This leads to a horizontal circulation between political and economic groups. This phenomenon is well known from the history of many western democracies, including the USA and France. As a result, representatives of the business elite gain office in regional administrations and legislatures. The contrary process, politicians entering business, is also possible.
Another approach is instrumental. This discusses the issue in terms of interest (or pressure) groups, lobbies and patron-client relations. The interest groups have their origin in economic relations, but in order to pursue their economic interests, they need political support. Patronclient relations arise, for example, when business groups try to achieve their economic goals with the help of friendly state and municipal authorities. In the process of integration, business groups and politicians form political-economic clans.
1 This sort of development usually occurs in cases of less transparent political regimes with an underdeveloped public policy sphere.
The latter approach is also close to the theory of rational choice. In terms of "business-power" relations, rational choice theory points out that business groups use friendly political power in order to expand their business. They thoroughly calculate profit coming as a result of political bodies' decisions and look at how expenditures on political campaigns and lobbyism pay off.
These approaches seem relevant to studies of "business-power" relations in Russia. The processes of both regime and elite transformation in Russia made the strengthening of ties between ruling elites and a rising business inevitable. The transformation of Russian regional elites is closely tied with the gradual loss of the Soviet nomenklatura's influence. There are several reasons why the business elite began to come to power in the Russian regions.
1. The Soviet nomenklatura is losing its positions in the regions due to generational change. 2. Post-Soviet business is the only source of the new elite that originated in the course of the reforms. And it represents the socially active part of modern Russian society. 3. The reforms made possible the change of the dominating regional leaders' type from ex-Soviet to "capitalist" manager.
But elite rotation in the Russian regions is very gradual. Our studies show that the share of former Soviet nomenklatura representatives among the Russian governors became less than 50 per cent only in the last few years. When the governors were appointed by the president in 1991-1995, Yeltsin chose them from the politically loyal nomenklatura. Few appointees were directors of industrial and agrarian enterprises. In the beginning of the 1990s Russia had neither oligarchy nor lobbyism.
The development of capitalism in Russia and the regional authorities: from colonialism to clientelism
In post-Soviet Russia, the formation of capitalist relations was the principal factor determining "business-power" relations. At the beginning of the economic reforms, the ruling elites at all levels set and led the privatization process. They could define the results of privatization deals and auctions; they could also screw competitors. Russian capitalism is commonly portrayed as state-bureaucratic and crony in nature. The ruling elite was a mixture of the old nomenklatura, new economists and brandnew businessmen.
